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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES STEEL 




INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
JERRY ALLEN TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Utah In-
dustrial Commission which decreed that apportionment 
of liability among successive workmen's compensation 
insurance carriers was not allowed in Utah in the ab-
sence of a statute specifically providing for apportion-
ment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Commission ruled that plaintiffs Argonaut 
Insurance Company and Mountain States Steel were 
liable to the applicant-employee, Jerry Taylor, for com-
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for his 15% permanent partial disability as well as his 
medical expenses and temporary total disability subse-
quent to the third of a series of three injuries to his back. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek to have the order of the Indus-
trial Commission reversed and have this court rule that 
apportionment of liability among successive Workmen 
Compensation insurance carriers is proper under the 
facts of this case. 
FACTS 
The applicant, Jerry Allen Taylor, sought compensa-
tion from the Utah State Industrial Commission for 
three back injuries which he alleged culminated in his 
permanent partial disability. In 1969, while working in 
Klakamus, Oregon, in the course of his employment with 
Linwood Lumber Company, the applicant injured his 
back while lifting. He was off work for three weeks as 
a result of this injury and was compensated for tem-
porary disability under the Oregon Workmen's Compen-
sation laws. 
He eventually moved to Utah and began working 
for Mountain States Steel on May 22, 1969, where he 
continued to be bothered by pain in his left leg as a re-
sult of the Oregon injury. While working at Mountain 
States Steel he again injured his back while pushing a 
welding unit in January of 1973. The industrial acci-
dent insurance carrier for Mountain States Steel at that 
time was the defendant Liberty Mutual. 
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The applicant continued work without losing any 
time due to the second injury until October 5, 1973, when 
he tripped and twisted his ankle while walking through 
the shop where he worked. His back was again injured 
as a result of his tripping. Following this injury, he 
underwent surgery for the repair of two herniated in-
tervertebral discs. The insurance carrier for the em-
ployer, (Mountain States Steel) at the time of this third 
injury was the plaintiff Argonaut. A hearing was held 
on March 7, 1974 before Eichard G. Sumsion, hearing 
examiner for the Utah State Industrial Commission on 
the questions of the applicant's disability and the liability 
of the respective compensation insurance carriers. 
Following the hearing, the applicant was referred 
to a special medical panel for an examination as to 
applicant's disability and the relationship of the appli-
cant's back condition to the various industrial accidents 
that he had sustained. 
No objections were filed to the medical panel find-
ings by any of the parties and the hearing examiner 
adopted the findings of the medical panel. The findings 
of the medical panel were that the applicant had suf-
fered a herniated but not extruded intervertebral disc 
as a result of the Oregon injury; that the injury of 
January 27, 1973 was a significant aggravating factor 
which contributed toward the eventual need for surgery; 
and that the third injury of October 3, 1973 was also a 
precipitating factor making surgery necessary at that 
time. The applicant was found to have a permanent 15% 
loss of body function, with 5% of that disability resulting 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from each of the three accidents. (Pages 118 - 121 on 
the Record of Appeal). 
The Examiner held that the applicant was entitled 
to benefits for the disability which resulted from the 
cumulative effect of the three injuries, and held each of 
the Utah carriers should pay one-third toward the ap-
plicants permanent partial disability. 
A motion for review was then filed by Liberty Mu-
tual with a supporting memorandum, which was opposed 
by Argonaut Insurance Company. The matter was re-
viewed by the Industrial Commission which reversed 
the Order of the Examiner, holding that : 
The State of Utah does not have an appor-
tionment statute and in the absence of the same 
we are of the opinion that the responsibility 
should be assigned to the last carrier. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 2; Record 
on Appeal, p. 142) 
The Commission continued: 
I t would appear to this Commission that there 
is some merit to the apportionment method ap-
plied by the New York Court but again we refer 
back to the Storer case [Duaine Brown Chevrolet 
Co. and Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Industrial 
Commission and Storer, 511 P.2d 743, 29 U.2d 
478 (1973)] where our court indicated we have 
no authority under present statute to make such 
an apportionment. (Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, page 3 ; Record on Appeal, p. 
143). 
4 
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The Commission then ordered Argonaut to pay com-
pensation for all of the permanent 15% disability and 
the medical expenses and temporary disability incurred 
subsequent to October 3, 1973. It is from this order that 
the plaintiffs bring this action, seeking reversal of the 
Commission's order. 
•-, ARGUMENT . - ^ c ^ : ^ : 
POINT I 
THE UTAH CASE AUTHORITY UPON 
WHICH THE COMMISSION BASED ITS 
ORDER IS NOT CONTROLLING UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
The Commission based its reversal of the Hearing 
Examiner's Order "primarily on the case of Duaine 
Brown Chevrolet Co. and Royal Globe Insurance Co., 
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah amd Arlen K. Storer, 
511 P.2d 743, 29 U.2d 478." (Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, page 2; Record on Appeal, p. 142). The 
Commission quoted the following language from the 
Duaine Brown case to support its holding that in the 
absence of an apportionment statute the full responsi-
bility for the disability should be assigned to the last 
carrier: 
Some states have apportionment statutes 
which allow a recovery to be prorated among 
multiple insurers. We have no such statute in 
the State of Utah, nor has the court attempted 
by decision to make apportionments. The record 
in this case would indicate that Storer's last in-
jury aggravated his prior disability and the atft 
5 
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of the commission in assessing the award against 
the plaintiffs was correct. (Record on Appeal, 
P- 1 4 2) . 
What the Commission failed to perceive in so hold-
ing is the critical difference between the facts of the 
Duaine Brown case and the fact of the instant case. In 
Duaine Brown the defendant Storer was employed by 
Duaine Brown Chevrolet Company, and while in the 
course of his employment there he suffered a back in-
jury on November 14, 1970. Prior to this time, he had 
suffered a back injury on April 1, 1970, while employed 
by Capitol Chevrolet Company, and had also suffered 
similar injuries in 19(35, 1966 and 1969. Storer filed for 
Workmen's Compensation benefits following his last in-
jury and the suit was heard by a hearing examiner after 
a medical panel had filed a report regarding the in-
juries. The medical panel in its report apportioned 
Storer 's physical impairment among the various ac-
cidents, which would have had the effect of apportioning 
liability between various employers (and, thus, among 
their respective insurance carriers). However, the hear-
ing examiner rejected the findings of the medical panel 
regarding apportionment, holding such an action to be 
improper. This was due to the fact that the chairman 
of the medical panel testified at the hearing that the 
medical panel was unable to attribute Storer's two herni-
ated discs to any particular accident. In short, the panel 
had been unable to attribute the injury to any particular 
accident or accidents and as a result had apportioned 
the injuries between several accidents. The Commis-
sion concurred in the findings of the Examiner and this 
6 
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court affirmed, stating that Utah had no apportionment 
statute allowing a recovery to be prorated among mul-
tiple insurers, "nor has the court attempted by decision 
to make apportionments." Under the facts of that case, 
the only decision that this court could reasonably have 
made was to affirm the refusal of the commission to 
apportion insurer's liability, since the medical panel had 
been unable to determine which accident or accidents 
caused the injury. 
Although the instant case is very similar on its facts, 
even to the type of injury involved, one critical difference 
exists which makes this case a proper one for apportion-
ment of the insurers' liability. Here the medical panel 
was able to apportion the physical impairments between 
three separate injuries, finding that a total 15% per-
manent disability existed with 5% of that disability 
attributable to each of the three accidents. The panel 
stated in its report, on page 3 : 
[the panel] is of the opinion that, though it 
may be somewhat arbitrary in nature, it would 
best be considered a reasonable medical prob-
ability that each of these events contributed one-
third to the need for surgery at this time. 
The panel discussed each of the three injuries in 
question, ruling specifically that each one contributed 
separately toward the total disability. In the Duaine 
Brown case, the panel, finding itself unable to attribute 
the disability to any particular injury, threw up its 
hands in frustration and divided the liability in a totally 
arbitrary fashion. Since the recommended apportion-
7 
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ment there was totally without supporting findings or 
evidence, the Commission in that case correctly ruled 
that apportionment was improper. 
The instant case presents a totally different situa-
tion, one where the panel clearly and unequivocally was 
able to divide the total physical disability into three sepa-
rate and distinct, but cumulative segments. Under this 
set of facts, the only logical and reasonable course to 
follow would be apportionment of the liability coinciding 
with the apportionment of the disability. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE RULE 
OF A P P O R T I O N M E N T UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Although Utah does not have a statute which ap-
portions liability among insurance carriers, the concept 
of apportionment is not foreign to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law of Utah. Section 35-1-69 provides that 
if an employee becomes permanently incapacitated as 
a result of an industrial injury while already suffering 
from a pre-existing permanent incapacity, the liability 
for the incapacity is apportioned according to a certain 
formula, provided that the incapacity following the last 
injury is "substantially greater" than the incapacity 
which would have existed without the last injury. This 
statute is commonly known as the second-injury fund 
statute, and its effect is to alleviate the harshness of the 
rule that the last insurer (i.e., employer) bears the bur-
8 
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den for the entire incapacity in certain situations. The 
statute reads in part as follows: 
A medical panel having the qualifications of 
the medical panel set forth in Section 35-2-56, 
shall review all medical aspects of the case and 
determine first, the total permanent psysical im-
pairment resulting from all causes and conditions 
including the industrial injury; second, the per-
centage of permanent physical impairment at-
tributable to the industrial injury; and third, the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury; and fourth, 
the percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to previously existing conditions 
whether due to accidental injury, disease or con-
genital causes. The Industrial Commission shall 
then assess the liability for compensation and 
medical care to the employer on the basis of the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment at-
tributable to the industrial injury only and the 
remainder shall be payable out of the said special 
fund. Amounts, if any, which have been paid by 
the employer in excess of the portion attributable 
to the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed 
to the employer out of said special fund. (Em-
phasis added). 
Were it not for the fact that none of the injuries in 
the instant case "substant ial ly" increased the incapacity 
of Mr. Taylor, 35-1-69 would be applicable, in which case 
the liability would have been apportioned between the 
last carrier and the special second-injury fund, into 
which all participating employers pay. 
I t is not argued that 35-1-69 applies to the instant 
situation, but it does set a statutory precedent for the 
9 
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concept of apportionment in the field of the law, and for 
that reason should be considered. 
Other than the Duaine Brown case, there appears 
to be no case in this jurisdiction which definitely decides 
whether or not apportionment of liability among Work-
men's Compensaton insurance carriers should exist in 
the absence of a statute, but many other courts have done 
so. 
As noted in the Commission's Findings, Conclusions 
and Order, pages 2 and 3, Larson on Workmen's Com-
pensation, Vol. 3, Section 95 reads as follows: 
When a disability develops gradually, or 
when it comes as a result of a succession of acci-
dents, the insurance carrier covering that risk at 
the time of the most recent injury or exposure 
bearing any causal relation to the disability is 
usually liable for the entire compensation. In 
some jurisdictions, apportionment has been work-
ed out by judicial decision, or provided for by 
express statute, when events within the coverage 
period of successive insurers contribute causally 
to the final disability. 
Mr. Larson further states that the above rule is 
"tempered in some jurisdictions by a practice permitting 
apportionment between two carriers when two successive 
accidents combine to produce the final disability." The 
leading case establishing this rule is Anderson v. Babcock 
and Wilcox Company, 175 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1931), wherein 
the injured employee fell while on the job on December 
3, 1926, fracturing his hip. The fracture apparently 
10 
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healed following medical care, and Anderson went back 
to work where, on August 8, 1927, while he was lifting a 
heavy timber, the fragments in the hip parted at the 
line of union, resulting in a disability. 
The first accident occurred while Anderson was in 
the employ of Carl Pierleoni, the second while he was 
working for Babcock and Wilcox Company. An award 
for the total disability was made against Babcock and 
Wilcox Company and its insurance carrier, Travelers, 
and from this award an appeal was taken. 
The court stated: 
Here it would seem that the evidence points 
conclusively to two accidents; that the bones 
merely parted does not appear. The healing and 
union were partial as was apparent from the evi-
dence as to the cracks felt in the hip at the same 
place where the fracture had been. . . The lifting 
of the heavy timber produced an accidental result. 
. . . Obviously that result would not have happen-
ed had it not been for the first injury, but it was 
immediately due to strain caused by heavy lifting. 
(175 N.E. at p. 655). 
The court continued: 
On the evidence the present disability exists 
by reason of the two accidents, and the compensa-
tion should be equally apportioned between the 
two insurers. Unjust it is that the second insurer 
should bear the entire liability when the second 
accident is related in large measure to the first. 
No less unjust it is that the first insurer should 
bear the entire liability if it appears that without 
I I 
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the second accident an earlier recovery might 
have been had. In no event does the evidence 
sustain an award against the second insurer alone. 
(175 N.E. at p. 655). 
The court then reversed and remanded the case to 
the Industrial Board for a determination as to how the 
liability should be apportioned. 
Subsequent to the Babcock decision, several cases 
have adopted a rule of apportionment under circum-
stances similar to those of the instant case. 
In Tri-State Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
379 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1963), the Colorado Industrial Com-
mission awarded compensation to one Boyd Ezell, find-
ing that he was 20% permanently but partially disabled 
as a working unit as a result of three separate back in-
juries. The first injury occurred on May 7, 1958, while 
working in Oklahoma, the second injury occurred on 
June 15, 1958 while working for Sooner Contracting 
Company in Colorado and the third injury occurred 
September 22, 1958, while again working for Sooner. 
The insurance carrier in June 1958 was Tri-State 
while the carrier in September, 1958 was Standard 
Casualty Company. 
The Commission apportioned the liability for the 
compensation due for the permanent disability equally 
between the two carriers. Tri-State appealed, urging 
that the apportionment was not proper under Colorado 
law. The fact that Sooner Company was liable for the 
12 
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entire injury was not disputed nor was the finding of 
20% disability. 
In upholding the Commission's decision, the court 
ruled that where two injuries occur during one employ-
ment, both of which contribute toward a permanent dis-
ability, and two carriers are involved, one with coverage 
of the first injury and one with the coverage of the sec-
ond, it is proper to apportion the award made for the 
total disability between the two, even in the absence of 
an apportionment statute. The court quoted from an 
earlier opinion, stating the reason for its holding. 
We think it is the policy of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act to at all times hold the em-
ployer primarily liable to the employee for dis-
ability proximately resulting from accidents aris-
ing out of and in the course of the employment. 
. . . It was not within the power of the employee 
to require the employer to insure in one company, 
nor was it within his power to prevent the em-
ployer from insuring with two companies; but it 
was within the power of the employer and the two 
insurance companies to provide as they might 
deem advisable against just such contingency as 
has here arisen. The Commission, as a fact-find-
ing body, has exercised its best judgment in assess-
ing the payment of this award against the two 
companies equally. . . . (379 P.2d at p. 391). 
In Haverland v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n., 
142 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1966), the court ruled that ap-
portionment was proper in a workman's compensation 
case where two or more injuries were causally connected 
with a resulting disability. 
13 
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Haverland, the employee, while in the course of his 
employment, injured himself on December 28,1960, while 
working for Twin City's Milk Producers. Surgery was 
required to repair a ruptured bicep muscle and he even-
tually returned to work where on October 13, 1961 he 
sustained a herniated intervertebral disc while working. 
Following hospitalization for this injury and subsequent 
partial recovery, he again returned to work. On Novem-
ber 21, 1961, while working for Tilleges Lumber Com-
pany in a part-time capacity, he was again injured when 
a truck backed over him and was subsequently hospital-
ized with serious injuries. He eventually returned to 
work where, on August 18, 1962 (while working for Twin 
Cities), he slipped and fell from a ladder, fracturing his 
right leg. Again, he returned to work following recovery 
and on the second day after returning he became ill and 
was hospitalized with what was diagnosed as severe men-
tal depression and conversion hysteria. 
Following this series of events, he filed a claim for 
permanent total disability due to his lack of capacity to 
perform any work stemming from his mental disease. 
He was awarded temporary total disability from August 
18, 1962 to August of 1973 and temporary partial dis-
ability for some months after that. The referee held 
that the insurer who covered the accident of August 18, 
1962 was liable for this award under the provisions of 
Minn. St. 1961, Section 176.13, which is similar to Sec-
tion 35-1-69 U.C.A. (1953). The Industrial Commission 
upheld this award and Twin Cities appealed, arguing 
that the award should be apportioned between it and 
those who were liable for the injuries prior to August 
18, 1962. 
14 
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The court reversed and remanded for a determina-
tion of whether or not the accidents prior to August 18, 
1962 were causally connected with the disability, saying: 
While we have not had occasion to pass directly 
on this question, we have approved apportion-
ment of liability for disability resulting from suc-
cessive accidents under the same employer be-
tween two insurers, one of whom represented the 
employer at the time of the first accident and the 
other of whom represented him when the second 
occurred [citations deleted}. 
I t appears reasonable that if liability for compen-
sation arising from two or more industrial acci-
dents under the same employer may be appor-
tioned between his successive insurers, it would 
likewise be apportionable between successive em-
ployers where industrial accidents are sustained 
under each of them, both of which contribute to 
the disability of the employee. Such apportion-
ment, of course, would be in the ratio that each 
accident bears to the total disability involved, but 
without limiting the primary responsibility of the 
last employer as provided in Section 176.13. (142 
N.W.2d at 280). 
In Mimd v. Farmers Cooperative, 94 A.2d 19, (Conn. 
1952), a workman's compensation case, the court opted 
for a rule of apportionment without a specific status 
dictating that such should be the practice. 
On July 29, 1946, the employee in question strained 
his back while in the course of his employment and while 
Ocean Accident & Guarantee, Ltd. was the insurance 
carrier for his employer. As a result of this accident he 
was disabled, but eventually returned to work following 
1 5 
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conservative treatment, suffering from a 15% permanent 
disability. On June 29, 1950, he re-injured his back while 
working for the same employer, but this time Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company was the carrier for his em-
ployer. This time surgery was performed and he even-
tually returned to work on October 16, 1950 still with a 
permanent disability (although the court's opinion does 
not specify the percentage of the disability after the 
second injury). An appeal was taken after the commis-
sion directed that both insurers should bear the cost of 
the disability and medical expenses following the second 
injury, and the issue on appeal was framed by the court 
as follows: 
The appeal presents the question of whether 
the [lower] court erred in sustaining the Com-
mission's decision requiring both of the defendant 
insurers as well as the defendant employer to pay 
the award. 
The court held, after discussion of the arguments 
presented by the insurers (each urging that the other 
should bear the full burden) that: 
There is a conflict of authority in other juris-
dictions on the respective liability of successive 
insurers, but the rulings of a substantial group 
of courts support our conclusion that the commis-
sioner's award against both insurers should be 
sustained. . . . It is our conclusion that upon the 
facts found in the present case common sense and 
fairness support the rule adopted in New York, 
Minnesota and Arkansas. The Commissioner's 
conclusion holding both insurers equally liable 
was properly sustained. (94 A.2d at p. 22). 
id 
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In Employer's Casualty Co. v. United Stales Fi-
delity and Guaranty Company, 214 S.W.2d 774 (Arkan-
sas 1948), an injured workman applied for compensation 
following an industrial injury. The employee injured 
his back while in the course of his employment on De-
cember 19, 1946, while pushing a wheelbarrow, but con-
tinued to work until February 14, 1947, although he was 
in pain during this entire period. After visiting several 
doctors, he was finally operated on for a herniated disc 
in his lower back on April 16, 1947. The state's Indus-
trial Commission found following its hearing that prior 
to December 19, 1946, the employee suffered from a pre-
existing back weakness which made him susceptible to 
injury, that he had aggravated this pre-existing condi-
tion on December 10, 1946, and that from December 19, 
1946 to February 14, 1947, he had continued to receive 
successive injuries to his back which progressively ag-
gravated his condition until these events finally culmina-
ted in a disability. U.S. Fidelity, was the workman's com-
pensation insurance carrier, on the employer in question 
prior to February 1, 1947, at which time, Employer's 
Casualty took over. The issue on appeal was framed 
by the court as follows: 
The question for our determination is the 
respective liabilities of these two insurance car-
riers to pay the award, it being appellant's con-
tention that the full liability should fall upon ap-
pellee, and appellee on cross-appeal argues that 
the full liability should fall upon appellant. (214 
S.W.2d at p. 774). 
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The court held as follows: 
In the circumstances here, while this court as 
above noted appears not to have specifically 
passed upon the question dividing liability, and 
while we think the evidence, when liberally con-
strued, was sufficient to have fastened liability 
on either of these insurance carriers for the full 
amount, we are unable to say that an equal divi-
sion of this liability, for a single disability, on the 
facts presented, was not within the Commission's 
power and we hold that the action of the trial 
court in affirming the Commission's order is sup-
ported by reason and authority. (214 S.W.2d at 
p. 777). 
Also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 445 P.2d 846 (Ariz. 1968) and Quinn v. Auto-
matic Sprinkler Co., 142 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1958). 
The common thread which runs through all of these 
cases is the fact that a compensable disability is causally 
connected with two or more injuries and it is possible to 
attach a percentage of the disability to each injury. This 
is exactly the situation in the instant case. Even though 
the Workmen's Compensation law of Utah is statutory 
rather than common law, this court still has the power 
to interpret and expand statutory law when the situa-
tion requires it. The facts of the instant case present a 
more compelling case for apportionment than any of the 
fact situations in the cases cited above, and the most 
sound and logical course to follow would be to apply the 
rule of apportionment in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs do not seek a blanket holding that 
apportionment should apply in all situations where two 
insurance carriers have coverage over a succession of 
injuries, nor do they even contend that apportionment 
is proper in all cases where two or more injuries result 
in a disability. All plaintiffs seek from this court is a 
ruling that under the facts of this particular case, where 
the medical panel is able to and clearly does, upon suf-
ficient evidence, divide the responsibility for a disability 
among two or more successive injuries, and where each 
of these injuries is found by the panel to be a partial 
cause of the total disability, and where a causal connec-
tion is found between each injury and the final disability, 
the liability for that disability (including the medical 
expenses incurred as a result) should be apportioned 
among successive insurance carriers and/or employers, 
should they exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert W. Brandt 
Jon J. Bunderson 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON 
& CHRISTOPHERSON 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Mountain States Steel Company 
amd Argonaut Insurance Company 
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